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Introduction
1. Twenty years  after the first 'North African' riots [Brion and Réa, 
1992], in the winter of 2011-2012 Brussels  was the scene of 'Congo-
lese' demonstrations  which some media and political officials  qualified 
as riots. Despite this representation, the idea that political conflicts of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) had been transposed to 
Belgium took hold, while the material damage, notwithstanding espe-
cially heavy riot suppression measures, seemed to have solidly en-
trenched the image of the violent demonstrator who only understood 
the language of the police baton. From there to seeing a certain conti-
nuity with the colonial repertory of the chicotte,1 was a step that some 
took, demonstrators and observers alike. 
2. Since then the fear and bewilderment over the uprising of a popu-
lation 'that caused no problems' have given way to a  symptomatic in-
visibility [Stavo-Debauge, 2007; Martiniello, 2011; Mazzocchetti, 2012]. 
A closer look, however, at the demands  made and the shape these 
'Congolese' demonstrations assumed reveals  a true post-colonial mal-
aise which merits  a  cool-headed examination. For, although the two 
weeks  of urban violence could indeed be called riots  - an expression 
which, in the West's  migratory context, basically refers  to the racializa-
tion of the global society [Solomos, 1988; Fassin and Fassin, 2008], 
how can one explain the differential treatment by the State compared to 
the North African riots  in the 1990s  which led to specific social and po-
licing policies [Cartuyvels and Hebberecht, 2001; Rea, 2006]?
3. Based on an ethnographic study of these demonstrations  (from 
December 2011 to March 2012) and research in Congolese communi-
ties  over the past 10 years (in Belgium, Canada and France) we aim to 
take account of the view of the Congolese minority and the local causal 
logics  that were neglected in the media coverage. This  social group, 
moreover, is not well known and misunderstood by public authority 
(Demart 2013a; Manco et al, 2013) and academics  as  well [Martiniello 
et al., 2007; Jamoule and Mazzocchetti, 2011; Schoonvaere, 2010]. 
This  is despite their longstanding presence in Belgium [Etambala, 1993; 
Mayoyo, 1995  ; Kagné, 2000; Kagné and Martiniello, 2001; Cornet, 
2004; Demart, 2013b].
4. For this  reason our commentary, developed in five different sec-
tions, will shift from one type of writing to another - from academic to 
ethnographic. In the first section, we will summarise the backdrop of 
these demonstrations. In the second, we will look more closely that the 
day which in our view was the turning point for the future development 
of events. The third section will trace the chronology of the 
demonstrator-police confrontations, and the fourth will discuss  the di-
versification of the participants  in the light of the growing intensity and 
racialization of the conflict. Lastly, we shall examine the political re-
sponses in a historical perspective, comparing them with policies intro-
duced in the 1990s following the 'North African' riots.
1. Placing the demonstrations in context
5. The politicising of the Congolese coincides with their presence in 
Belgium and from the 1970s took the form of demonstrations  de-
nouncing the policies of their homeland [Tshimanga; 2003; Bodeux and 
Demart, 2013]. During the period of transition (2001-2006) in the after-
math of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila's  assassination, the demon-
strations  intensified and spread to the transnational sphere of emigrants 
under the impetus  of the 'Combatants' [Godin and Garbin, 2013] 
1
1 The chicotte is a leather whip made of strips used regularly in colonial times. Applied to the indigenous people of the Belgian Congo, it was associated with the domestication of individu-
als and bodies through the public example of flogging imposed as a sentence.
Sarah DEMART, 
Riots in Matonge and… the indifference of public authority?, 
Brussels Studies, Number 68,
July 1st 2013, www.brusselsstudies.be
whose intention was  to exert pressure on the power in Kinshasa  and on 
the international community whose (in)action was  collectively perceived 
in Congolese circles  as the result of the West's designs on the wealth 
that lay beneath the Congo soil.
6. A pressure group formed in the UK in the early 2000s and now 
found throughout the diaspora, the 'Combatants' express the need to 
take up arms to liberate the country. They are often dressed in military 
fatigues, and are in open conflict with representatives of the Congolese 
state who reside in or visit Europe. With the help of the electoral calen-
dar, from 2011 their calls for demonstrations to change the regime in 
Kinshasa multiplied first in Brussels  and then throughout the world 
wherever there were large Congolese communities. The people of this 
diaspora neither have the right to hold dual citizenship, nor can they 
vote from abroad. 2
7. In Brussels  the demonstrations took the form of demands  submit-
ted to the Belgian government following remarks by a Socialist Senator 
who, on her return from an observation mission in the DRC, affirmed 
that the election process was going about correctly. After this  an-
nouncement, on 4 December the militants, some holding Belgian citi-
zenship, gathered before the Senator's  party headquarters, demanding 
an explanation, but were barred from entering. They refused to leave, 
but were chased away by police water cannons. They then decided to 
move the demonstration to the DRC Embassy, only to find the street 
there blocked by patrol cars. Angry, they returned to Matonge and on 
the way they shattered car windows  and overturned rubbish bins. 
There were also skirmishes  with local businesses  who would not let the 
demonstrators throw their tables and chairs.
8. When they reached Matonge and the chaussée d'Ixelles, they be-
gan to chanting slogans and singing, in a demonstrators-police face-
off. Around 6:30 pm the situation worsened as the group moved to-
wards the chaussée de Wavre. Calm was restored around 10:00 pm 
after shop windows  were shattered, cars  damaged and about 30 peo-
ple arrested. The next day the demonstrators  arranged via sms  and 
social media to meet at 2:00 pm at the exit of the Porte de Namur 
metro. Due to the journalists' late arrival it was  not possible to report on 
and record a  violence that can be considered as  the turning point for 
the outcome of later demonstrations.
2. A violent turning point that happened off camera
9. A group of about 50 people had gathered by 3:00 pm. One man 
shouted to the passers-by 'You don't want us here, but we'd like to 
leave and go home too! We're fed up with debt collectors and bills!' 
while a  woman tried to convince the (North African) employees of the 
nearby Quick (fast food restaurant) of the need to change the regime in 
the Congo, drawing inspiration from recent developments  in the Arab 
world. Some demonstrators, young girls  and 'mommas', chose to stay 
out of the cold and watched the demonstration take shape from inside 
the Quick. One woman yelled at me:
'Are you here to observe? Are you a journalist? 'Cause if you have a 
camera we'll break it!'
'No, I'm a researcher. I've already participated in several marches.'
'Well said, Aunty!' continued a young woman in perfect French. 'Yes 
indeed, Madame, because the journalists don't tell the truth! They 
take pictures, but afterwards  they don't show anything and we end 
up looking like idiots! Our country is  so rich. It's OK if the West wants 
a part of it, but they have to share, and first let us take what we need 
to get by!'
10. We talked for a while, then one of the demonstrators called on us 
to join the group to make the movement more visible. Outside several 
2
2 On the political issues at stake in these demonstrations, see DEMART S. ' 'Kabila est rwandais': une accusation sorcière. Transitions politiques en République Démocratique du Congo, 
diaspora and pentecôtisme.', to be published.
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people were talking to one of the plain clothes  policemen. The demon-
stration had not been authorised. Because of the violence the day be-
fore? For the demonstrators  'it's always like that for the Congolese: 
they never let us demonstrate during the week.' Negotiations  were un-
derway, the atmosphere was  friendly and the demonstrators  continued 
to sing. Most of them seemed to be of recent migrations  (1990s and 
2000s). Two young men made their way into the group. The way they 
spoke and their clothing were discretely different from the others. You 
could tell that they were born here. One of them pointed to the police 
lorries  parked along the Boulevard de la Toison d'Or: 'those over there, 
we'll ... direct'. 
11. It was  icy cold outside. A few minutes  passed, and then members 
of the police force ran up and in a single row surrounded the group of 
demonstrators. It was  impossible to escape and several women began 
to panic. A demonstrator called on everyone to sit down, but only part 
of the group did so. 'Don't worry, they can't do anything.' one of the 
demonstrators  said while another handed a  traffic sign over to a po-
liceman, who took it. Not one word was exchanged during these inter-
actions. Suddenly a young woman was  shoved into the circle, she 
asked to have her camera back. This  militant of Panafrican socialism 
had been filming. The only visual trace of this  incident, which was 
loaded on YouTube, is  an extract showing policemen who forbid her 
from filming 'either you stop, or you get in [the circle]'.
12. Suddenly blows  of truncheons rained down on arms and on 
heads. The police clubbed women as well as men. The demonstrators 
attempted to escape and tried not to fall. Something stung my face, 
and it was  impossible to breathe or open my eyes. A few steps  away a 
group of young girls, scandalised, whose accents identify them as Bel-
gians, cried out 'We'll be back!'
13. During the police chase that followed the circling described above 
several incidents  of police brutality occurred, the most mediatised con-
cerned that of a man of Angolan origin who worked at the Theatre Mo-
lière in the galerie of the Porte de Namur. He was  chased back to his 
workplace and beaten by several police officers. Two weeks  later the 
marks  left by the blows  were still visible on his back and legs (scars, 
cracked ribs, gashes on his legs), and images were posted on the 
Internet.
14. Throughout the afternoon the police attempted to get the demon-
strators  to disperse. The size of the group was growing and could no 
longer be contained in the small meeting point, nor on the pavement 
across  the street in front of the bank. During this  tense face-off, the 
group were not so much forbidden to demonstrate as they were to 
step off the pavement. On several occasions  the police would surround 
the demonstrators to contain them then after a short while, retreat. 
Each time the demonstrators  then invaded the street crying victory. And 
the police would return. A bizarre state of affairs  clearly destined to lead 
to a stalemate.
15. The journalists  arrived near the end of the day, some almost at 
nightfall. The demonstrators did not welcome the presence of some of 
the French-speaking journalists  and they were not given direct access 
to the events. This  day was only partially reconstructed in the media, 
even though it initiated a  confrontation that the press retransmitted daily 
for the next two weeks. Images  of this day were mainly those of the 
destruction along the chaussée de Wavre after the demonstrators  re-
treated again to Matonge's  main street. Windows  of shops  run by 
Rwandans, but not exclusively, were shattered, rubbish sacks  were 
torn apart, cars  burned. The following week it was  reported that some 
fifty complaints  had been lodged concerning the police practices that 
night. According to their testimonies, men were 'clubbed' and 'gassed' 
in their gaol cells  when they refused to stop singing. 'You're savages,' 
they heard someone say. At the end of this  day, the commune of Ixelles 
forbade all assemblies  of over ten people until the next Monday, pun-
ishable by a fine of 250 €.
3. From a demonstration to a riot?
16. Despite the commune's  injunction the demonstrations continued, 
on a daily basis  and spontaneously. In turn tolerated, negotiated, re-
prohibited, these gatherings  spurred by the 'Combatants' often after a 
night spent in the Etterbeek police barracks, affected an ever larger 
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public. Filmed and posted the same day on social media, these in-
stances  of demonstrations  and confrontations  with the police, occa-
sionally hidden from the 'public' fed the demonstrators' enthusiasm 
and their speech. On 7 December, about a hundred demonstrators 
gathered at the Porte de Namur and by the end of the evening seven 
had been arrested. The next day a group of 100 Congolese students 
arranged to meet before the European Parliament to submit a  memo-
randum asking Europe to play an active role in the DRC. They were 
quickly surrounded by the police. The black people were forced to stay 
inside the circle unlike the whites  who were free to come and go. This 
racial demarcation, a  constant feature of the police control - to the 
point of calling out to if not pushing to the ground mere passers-by - 
was  perceived as  a  form of 'racism' and police 'provocation', then 
quickly came to be seen as  the proof of Belgium's  involvement in the 
crimes  perpetrated in the DRC. This  drew non-politicised people, 
youths  and middle-aged women, to join the movement, saying 'Tshise-
kedi, Kabila who cares, we just want them to free our country.' At the 
same time a growing number of people alternated between watching 
and participating, moving from one attitude to another or both at the 
same time in the space of several days.
17.  From day one, the question of destruction was debated, with the 
observers also sharing in the dialogue: Should one damage property 
and risk being further stigmatised, or not damage anything and risk 
once again not even being heard?
18.  On 9 December the results of the election were announced: Jo-
seph Kabila was  proclaimed the winner. 192 demonstrators  spent the 
night in the federal police barracks in Etterbeek and Molotov cocktails 
were hurled at the Ixelles police station by two 'unidentified individuals'. 
But it was  mainly the growing number of demonstrators  that rendered 
so complex the territorial organisation of this  conflict, the centre of 
which remained the Porte de Namur metro exit. At the end of the after-
noon, one could see youths (so called 'second generation') flee down 
the streets  off the avenue de la Toison d'Or. A bit later another group of 
youths  escaped the police circle and, before dispersing, crossed the 
Petite Ceinture intersection in a single file, forcing cars  to brake sharply 
as they exited the tunnel. The police, both in uniform and plain clothes, 
ran after them. Some of the youths were arrested. At the Porte de Na-
mur roundabout some observers  were afraid when they saw the police 
arrive. A few fled, but others stopped them 'Don't ever run, if you do 
they might arrest you.' Others  protested the police actions, especially 
when the arrests were heavy handed with several officers dealing with 
just one person.
19. On Saturday 10 December the demonstrators (a group of 400) 
were authorised to gather near the DRC Embassy, although the street 
itself (Marie de Bourgogne) was  closed off. They were not able to place 
the portrait of Etienne Tshisekedi who, the day before, had proclaimed 
himself 'President elected by the Congolese people'. The group was 
furthermore unable to take advantage of their proximity to the European 
institutions  for the relatively deserted rue Montoyer gave them no visibil-
ity. That evening 'only' one car was  burned and there were two admin-
istrative arrests.
20. The following Monday, after the Sunday truce, the day was  calm, 
and the media were able to take stock of the situation: 500 administra-
tive arrests, 20 tried and 50 complaints  lodged. An authorised demon-
stration was  planned for the following Saturday. It mobilised over 2,000 
people (1,200 according to the police, 3,000 according to the organis-
ers), escorted by an armada of police officers. 
21. A few hours  later, Matonge once again looked like a battleground 
with the territory of this  latest conflict reorganised around the chaussée 
de Wavre. After several hours, the results were 144 arrests, 40 to 50 
vehicles damaged, dozens of windows  broken on the rue Belliard, 
chaussée d'Ixelles, chaussée de Wavre and the Place St Boniface. Six-
teen police officers  were wounded. The next day, the damage was  im-
puted to 'gangs' on the basis  of police files. The interpretation was 
adopted by the media and then by politicians. All gatherings  were once 
again prohibited and police presence was  doubled. There were numer-
ous police controls, especially by plainclothesmen, during the day.
22. The number of demonstrators wounded was  not reported, despite 
a particularly heavy handed repression, including incidents  involving 
very young adolescents. On 17 December, last day of the large dem-
onstrations  in Brussels, the French-speaking television viewers  were 
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shocked to demonstrators  calling on people to vote for the N-VA (New 
Flemish Alliance). Draped in the flag of Flanders, the man interviewed 
explained: 'The NVA tells the truth: they say they don't like the Congo-
lese, they don't like Blacks... the PS, MR and CdH just pretend they 
do.'3 In addition to a convergence of nationalist goals, threats  of sanc-
tions  via the ballot box also expressed the notion of reciprocity ('You're 
destabilising our country? We can also destabilise yours!' 'You want to 
keep Belgium for the Belgians? Well, we want the Congo for the Con-
golese!'). This  instrumentalisation of Belgian ethnicity yielded results  in 
the end for after the 'riots' in Brussels several authorised demonstra-
tions  were organised in Flanders  without incident. Following this, dem-
onstrations  were once again authorised in Brussels, outside Matonge, 
on condition of discrete police supervision, without horses, dogs, heli-
copters  or water cannons. No clashes  were reported. And still today, 
marches have been regularly organised in Brussels, but Belgian State 
Security Service has henceforth classified the 'Combatants' movement 
as a 'threat'. 4
4. Postcolonial demands
23. Over time and as  the confrontations became more heated, the 
population of demonstrators, it is  said, became more diversified, show-
ing a certain racialization of the conflict. Young people became more 
visible, most often together with others of the same age group, occa-
sionally with their parents. Their motivations? A group of young girls  
explained that 'The Congo is  our future.' This  was a recurring theme, 
explicitly linked to the lack of prospects  in Belgium for black people and 
'especially' for Congolese. Another group of young boys  went even 
farther: 'We're fed up, we'd like to go home too at a certain time. But 
what does  that mean? That means that Mundele should get off our 
backs, Mundele that means  White Man, he should let us  be! Stop inter-
fering in what's  not his  business, because his  curiosity sometimes 
leads  to this  type of consequence. Because we're fed up we are, and 
now the people are rising and they want to try to build something. So 
you have to let the people build...' And his  friend continued in an angry 
tone: 'White Man has to leave us  be! Didier Reynders, Louis  Michel and 
all that - look at the police force they've set up here. They let the Con-
golese cry like animals  from 2 to 7. So White Man should let us, that's 
it. A white bloke looks  at me because he's surprised at what I'm saying, 
Yes! Let's  be frank! Yes, the White man must let the African, because 
Reynders, while we our here demonstrating, is  eating - feeding his face 
and getting as  fat as Bart De Wever! Huh, so leave us  be, White man! 
One day we'll get revenge, so don't talk about diversity now! Let Congo 
get its stuff together...'
24. Asked about his nationality, he refused to say he was Belgian (al-
though his  ID shows that he is) - 'look at my skin' and his  friend points 
out that for Belgians does  not change a thing 'when a Belgian is in the 
Congo and he speaks  Lingala and eats pondu, is  anyone going to ask if 
he's Belgian?' A passerby wanted to take a picture, he waved him off 
angrily. 'No pictures, no pictures, I'm no animal! Go take a picture of 
Leopold (the statue of Leopold II across the boulevard), I'm no animal!'
25. The participation in the march of many leaders  among the dias-
pora (from associations, religious  leaders and, to a  lesser extent, politi-
cians) was  noted. These people did not make any media statements 
nor did they try to place their own organisation to the forefront. They 
were there in the wish to be part of this collective movement and voice 
their demands. As one occasional demonstrator said, 'Belgium is a 
reactionary country that only understands physical force, if  we break 
things: "Oh, so these people do exist, then something must be done for 
them"... Seeing the history that unites  Belgium to the Congo, in none of 
the Belgian institutions, do you see any executives  of Congolese origin, 
or else there are just two or three, that's definitely not enough. It's an 
admission of weakness  by the institutions  in Belgium that want to keep 
the Congolese issue shut. Well, I'm not going to go on and on about 
the Belgium-Congo disputes... For example, my son or my nephews 
don't understand why they are here. They don't know their history and 
5
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4 cf. Press conference by Alain Winants, general administrator for the State Security Service, 21 November 2012.
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their schoolmates  don't know why there's just one Black in their class. 
It's  completely unbelievable... Their parents  shed their blood so this 
country could be stable and Belgium must acknowledge this...The 
Congolese community is an integral part of the history of Belgium.'
5. Racialization of social relations and ethnicization of riots in 
Belgium?
26. The escalation of the clashes with the police, the damage and the 
loss of control by the organisers  fostered a form of collective action that 
could indeed be qualified as rioting. This  could be said for youths  but 
also for those less young who took advantage of the situation to 'settle' 
[Rea, 2001] their disputes  with the police and 'society', and also get 
back at the Belgian state, even if in the end the targets were individuals. 
If some actors came forward to express  a  political discourse to the 
media [Martiniello, 1992], they did not do this as  leaders. At the same 
time the membership of some of spokespersons  in established (Bel-
gian) parties came to a clamorous end.
27. Aside the mediatised looting on 17 December of a jewellery store 
on the chaussée d'Ixelles, no robberies were reported in the local 
'youth' stores like 'Zara', 'H&M' or 'Sportsworld' which were the tar-
gets  on several occasions of volleys  of stones. The destruction was the 
work of individuals acting alone and/or coming together by spontane-
ously. It was  definitely not caused by group action that could be quali-
fied as  'urban guerrilla' by 'gangs' and 'organised plunderers'. 5 On the 
other hand the idea that 'they (the police) purposely push us back to-
wards Matonge so we'll only tear up our own places' fed a desire to 
'fight back' and to destroy property outside the 'African' neighbour-
hood. It also deepened more 'structural' frustrations that spurred rioters 
less young to throw stones.
28. Holding particular groups to blame for urban violence does  not 
stand up under empirical evidence and ends by avoiding two basic 
questions: what where the demands  of this  (plural)  minority? Were there 
shortcomings  in the police and political response? In addition to the 
material destruction seen from the angle of individual property, it would 
also be interesting to look at the question from a more global angle, 
relating to the public interest, about the cost of this  police riot suppres-
sion mechanisms  and lastly on how effective it actually is. This is  for 
two basic reasons: the 'Congolese' riots  were not the first of the sort, 
and additionally the policies  they generated in the follow-up were far 
from having the same structural impact as those that followed the 
'North African' riots. Without entering into a discussion on the ethnici-
zation of social policies  suggested by this  remark, we would neverthe-
less  like to point out that the process of marginalisation that arose from 
this differential treatment helped amplify this urban unrest.
29. In 2001, following the death (at the Porte d'Anderlecht) of a  young 
man, presumed to be a dealer, at the end of a  police chase, riots broke 
out in Matonge in a context which, since the 1970s, was one of con-
stant police controls  in the neighbourhood in the streets, bars and 
shops. Announcement of the young man's death sparked four days of 
conflicts  between the police and Matonge regulars  (customers, busi-
nesses, youths): objects, paving stones and rubbish bags  thrown, cars 
burned, businesses  vandalised, etc. Once the calm returned, the newly 
elected communal government introduced a policy of 'friendly over-
tures', focused more on prevention, yet relying heavily on the local as-
sociations and their volunteer work. This was quite different from the 
social and public safety policies  aimed at minorities  of North African 
origin, one feature of which was  to associate (hire) people coming from 
these neighbourhoods, in particularly young graduates  experiencing 
discrimination in their search for jobs [Cartuyvels and Heberrecht, 2001; 
Réa, 2006]. 
30. In Matonge the paltry subsidies granted maintained the associative 
actors  in uncertain work conditions for several years  until they were let 
go once social ties  had nevertheless  been re-established (between 
those who frequented the neighbourhood and the police and the 
commune, between the adult business owners  or local residents and 
youths, etc.). Their missions were supposedly transferred to the com-
6
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munal agents  (supervising 'urban gangs', 'emergency' intervention 
methods, techniques of management and mediation integrating the 
neighbourhood's or the diaspora's  urban sub-culture, implementing 
projects that integrated the local population, and so on). The with-
drawal of the associative actors and closing of the community policing 
unit in 2009 were facets  of this  dynamics  that undermined years of pre-
ventive work during which, according to the police commissioner re-
sponsible for the neighbourhood, the crime rate dropped 42% (2005-
2009).
31. So is  that why, when cars  were burned that December, public 
authority did not call on this  associative mediation, which in the past 
had dealt with much broader demonstrations? The question remains 
open. In the meantime, the entrenched marginalisation of this  popula-
tion is  palpable in view of the institutional policies  for co-optation and 
integration available for other minorities and which proved their worth in 
eradicating everyday urban unrest [Rea, 2006]. One can obviously dis-
cuss the methods and relevance of the 'occupational' approach [Car-
tuyvels, 1996] to which moreover the Congolese public (both youths 
and associations) do not adhere [Manço et al, 2013]. One can also cer-
tainly question the public safety-based paradigm which, as several 
studies  have shown, is  incapable of fighting against discrimination, 
stigmas  associated with certain groups and neighbourhoods, and even 
against the fear of crime [Campenhoudt et al, 2000; Cartuyvels  and 
Hebberecht, 2001; Schaut, 2000]. In a comparative perspective, how-
ever, one cannot help but note that the Congolese and more generally 
minorities  of sub-Sahara African origin have not been able to benefit 
from socio-professional integration and recognition policies.
Conclusion 
32. If at the start the 'Congolese' demonstrations  of the winter of 
2011-2012 revolved around political change in the DRC and involved a 
part of the population that did not entirely represent the whole diaspora, 
it must be concluded that as the days went by more diversified political 
expressions made themselves  heard. Even amidst the growing raciali-
zation of the conflict the somewhat widespread idea that one 'had to 
destroy to be heard' was, despite appearances, counterbalanced by 
the fear of bringing more stigma on the community. The police, media 
and political hypothesis of 'gangs' was validated by some organisers  as 
well when the revolt got out of hand, and this  even when they had been 
the ones to publicly call on the community to demonstrate.
33. As regards the ethnicization of social integration policies ex-
pressed in the differential management of urban unrest, the State's re-
action, in the very temporality of the riots  and on the scale of their repe-
tition a  decade later, raises  questions. Various factors  could explain this 
lopsided policy approach: the size of the communities (about 60,000 
Congolese compared to 300,000 Moroccans), the rhythm, scale and 
location of the riots (Matonge in 2001 and 2011 compared to Forest in 
May 1991 and Molenbeek in April 1995, and Anderlecht in November 
1997). Another factor may well be the residential logics of the groups; 
on the one hand the 'North African' or even strictly 'Moroccan' neigh-
bourhoods and on the other the spatial dispersion of Congolese 
throughout Brussels  (and Belgium as well). This said, the history shared 
between Belgium and the Congo in which this differentiated approach 
takes root appears  to the associative actors of Congolese origin, per-
manently relegated to a volunteer status, as the expression of a raciali-
zation of social policies. This  is because the institutions  have recog-
nised the efficiency of their practices  in terms of eliminating urban un-
rest and violence as  re-establishing a social link with the State (com-
mune, police, etc.). What raises a problem is the continuation of this 
socio-educative work and what it requires of these actors  in terms  of 
sustainable and autonomous  integration, particularly from the financial 
point of view.
34. In addition to the 'inter-community' tension this  ethnicization of 
policies may provoke (in the area of cultural centres  for example)  it is 
the anger and the frustration felt towards  a separate way of treatment, 
postcolonial, which was expressed well beyond the political context of 
the demonstrations  in December 2011. The racial and racist undercur-
rents that emerge, once the narrations of the actors  are taken seriously, 
clearly highlight the social invisibility of the Congolese and more gener-
ally black people in Belgium, and provide a  key for understanding the 
genesis of postcolonial riots in Brussels. 
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